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PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
FRANKIE MCCARTHY*
INTRODUCTION
A scholar with an interest in the constitutional property rights of
any legal system will eventually find herself exploring the literature
from the United States. Over the years, the Takings Clause has
generated such a treasure trove of judicial thought and legal writing
that to ignore it is to impoverish the property rights scholarship of
other jurisdictions. It was a genuine delight, therefore, to read that
the 2016 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference was to be
held in Europe, and that continental property scholars would be
invited to participate in an exchange of knowledge with the expert
U.S. delegates who have made the conference what it is over the
years. During my three days in The Hague last October, I not only
learned a great deal, I also enjoyed one of the warmest and most col-
legiate conference experiences of my career to date. It was a pleasure,
if not a surprise, to find that the hospitality of U.S. property rights
lawyers is every bit as rich as their writing.
This paper continues in the spirit of that happy exchange of legal
cultures, making use of scholarship from both the United States and
Europe to develop a novel argument that will, I hope, be of rele-
vance on both sides of the Atlantic. The focus of the paper is the
constitutional property protection provided to European citizens by
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (“Convention”). This protection has been available in
Europe since 1954, and has given rise to a huge volume of cases both
in the domestic courts of European states and before the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”).1 However, it has yet to receive
* Senior Lecturer in Private Law, University of Glasgow. My thanks to Professor John
A. Lovett and colleagues from the College of Law, Loyola University New Orleans, and to
participants at the 2016 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference for valuable comments
on earlier drafts of this article. All mistakes are my own.
1. For an overview of the jurisprudence, see DAVID HARRIS, ED BATES, MICHAEL O’BOYLE
& CARLA BUCKLEY, HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 18 (3d ed. 2014).
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the kind of detailed, theoretical analysis that U.S. scholars have
delivered in respect to the Takings Clause. My paper fills that gap
by developing a theoretical analysis that builds upon the work
carried out in the United States.
The research question I address concerns the normative values
underlying European property protection. Carol Rose, Emerita Pro-
fessor of Law at Yale University and recipient of the 2010 Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Prize, and Gregory Alexander, A. Robert
Noll Professor of Law at Cornell University and a member of Cor-
nell’s influential progressive property group, have argued in their
works that a tension can be identified in U.S. takings jurisprudence
between two competing accounts of property and property rights.
The first and perhaps prevailing account in the United States is that
of property as a commodity, a tool to maximise the satisfaction of
individual preferences through the maximisation of wealth. The
second account is that of property as propriety, a tool to maintain
the appropriate social order.2 In this paper, I consider whether a
similar tension, with the risk of incoherence in the jurisprudence that
it creates, can be identified in the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights.
The paper is made up of three sections. In the first, I explain the
theoretical lens through which I will examine the European property
rights protection, summarising the competing accounts of property as
developed in the works of Rose and Alexander. In the second, I
outline the constitutional property protection offered by Article 1 of
the First Protocol, explaining its place in the European legal order
and the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights
when adjudicating an application in respect of property rights. In
the final part, I explore the extent to which the competing accounts
of property identified by U.S. scholars can be identified in relation
to the European constitutional property protection. My analysis is
focused on what can be learned from the wording of Article 1 itself,
from the approach taken by the court to define which possessions
merit the protection of the Convention, and from the requirement
developed by the court that compensation must be paid in every
case where an applicant is deprived of ownership. In concluding, I
2. See infra Part I for further explanation of property as “commodity” and property as
“propriety.”
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suggest that the normative inconsistency found in U.S. jurispru-
dence is also identifiable in European case law and suggest that, as
in the United States, understanding that normative conflict can help
to explain certain incoherencies. In this way, I offer some insight
into how we “do” constitutional property in Europe, and also demon-
strate how valuable a cross jurisdictional understanding of constitu-
tional property scholarship can be in developing a novel analysis of
mono-jurisdictional issues.
I. UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: TWO STORIES
Within the U.S. scholarship on constitutional property, a line of
argument that has been developed particularly by Rose3 and Alex-
ander4 posits that competing understandings of the purpose of
property as a legal institution can be discerned in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, even though these notions may not have been explic-
itly described or acknowledged in the judgments themselves. Rose
suggests that the famously “muddled”5 nature of takings jurispru-
dence results, in fact, from this unacknowledged conflict over the
core purpose of property law.
Both authors describe these competing visions in broadly similar
terms, although the terminology varies. In her works, Rose dis-
cusses the concept of property as “preference-satisfaction” in opposi-
tion to the idea of property as “propriety.”6 Alexander focuses on
property as “commodity” in contrast to (borrowing explicitly from
Rose) property as “propriety.”7 In short, the commodity approach
3. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Rose, Mahon Reconstructed]; Carol M.
Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 NOMOS 223 (Robert W. Gordon &
Margaret Jane Radin eds., 1991), as reprinted in CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION:
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 49 (1994) [hereinafter Rose,
Property as Wealth] (this article references pagination in the reprint).
4. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970 (1997) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, COM-
MODITY AND PROPRIETY].
5. See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed, supra note 3, at 561.
6. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 52–58 (property as preference satisfaction),
58–65 (property as propriety).
7. See ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 1 (setting out the con-
cept of property as commodity), 2 (setting out the concept of property as propriety).
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sees property as an institution designed to allow for the realisation
of individual autonomy through the maximisation of preference satis-
faction. The propriety approach sees property as the material foun-
dation for creating and maintaining the social order—the private
basis for the public good.8 Although neither of these approaches
precludes the possibility of legitimate government takings of prop-
erty, the conditions in which such takings will be justified and the
consequences for expropriated owners will vary significantly de-
pending on which account dominates. Alexander’s work makes plain
that these conflicting notions of property have existed, in one form
or another, throughout the history of American legal thought, chal-
lenging the claim that a single historical conception of property can
be identified, let alone relied upon, by modern-day jurists who must
determine or justify constitutional property decisions. In Rose’s
view, it is the Supreme Court’s unarticulated vacillation between
the two approaches that has resulted in a jurisprudence lacking
overall coherence.
The following section will provide a fuller account of the commod-
ity and propriety approaches to property, before considering their
repercussions for constitutional property protection.
A. Property as Commodity
Based in part on the work of Stephen Munzer,9 Rose’s account of
property as “preference-satisfaction” posits that the key purpose of
any property law regime is maximisation of the satisfaction of in-
dividual preferences through maximisation of wealth. Property law
facilitates this process of wealth maximisation by enabling legal
persons to obtain secure rights in things. A person has an incentive
to work on enhancing the value of her things, since her secure rights
give her confidence that she will reap the rewards of that effort in
due course. In so doing, she increases the wealth of society as a
whole.10 Rose describes this as:
8. Id. at 1.
9. See generally Stephen R. Munzer, Compensation and Government Takings of Private
Property, 33 NOMOS 195 (1991).
10. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 52–55.
2017] PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND THE ECHR 5
[T]he standard but very powerful story about property as a pref-
erence-satisfying institution. According to that story, a property
regime satisfies preferences not by divvying up a finite bag of
resources, but rather by encouraging behaviour that enhances
resources’ value, making the total bag a whole lot bigger and
more diverse.11
Alexander’s commodity account situates the same basic concept
within an explanation that emphasises the concept’s role in separat-
ing public from private, noting that this view suggests property has
one core purpose:
[T]o define in material terms the legal and political sphere within
which individuals are free to pursue their own private agendas
and satisfy their own preferences, free from governmental coer-
cion or other forms of external interference. Property, according
to this understanding, is the foundation for the categorical sepa-
ration of the realms of the private and public, individual and
collectivity, the market and the polity.12
In this account of property, governmental takings can be justified
only in limited circumstances, since every instance of a taking under-
mines the security of property rights. Certain projects—the con-
struction of large-scale infrastructure might be an example—are
capable of greater wealth maximisation when publicly managed. In
these situations, a taking is justified, provided that the expropriated
owner is compensated for her loss. The compensation is necessary
not just in recognition of the effort already made by the owner to
enhance the value of her thing but to reassure others that it re-
mains worthwhile to work on enhancing the value of their things.13
The government is also justified in preventing a use of property
without payment of compensation if that use does not maximise the
overall wealth of society. Prevention of nuisance and prohibition or
regulation of monopolies both fall into this category.14
The idea of property as commodity can be seen to fall within a
liberal tradition focused on the attainment of individual autonomy:
11. Id. at 54–55.
12. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 1.
13. Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 57.
14. Id. at 57–58.
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freedom from (in this case, state interference) rather than freedom
to carry out any particular activity.15
B. Property as Propriety
The alternative conception of property is termed by both authors
as property as “propriety.” In this account, the key purpose of prop-
erty as an institution is to ensure that each person or entity has
“that which is needed to keep good order in the . . . body politic”16: no
more and no less. In Alexander’s terms, propriety recognizes prop-
erty law as “the material foundation for creating and maintaining
the proper social order, the private basis for the public good.”17
Alexander identifies the propriety approach as in keeping with
the Aristotelian understanding of human beings as fundamentally
interdependent creatures, who therefore owe one another obliga-
tions as an incident of their very humanity.18 The notion of property
as propriety can be traced back to the political traditions of Western
Europe in the Middle Ages. At that time, the social order was
strictly hierarchical, with the monarch at the head of the state, the
husband and father at the head of the family, and various permuta-
tions in between. (The value of having such a rigid hierarchy was
seldom questioned in political philosophy: the universe was accepted
as being formed in hierarchy with God at the top.) A person at the
head of a given hierarchy was granted property rights in combination
with responsibilities to those further down the pyramid. Property
was, in a sense, simply one aspect of the broader role the person was
required to fulfil. Property law was therefore viewed as a mecha-
nism for maintaining the social order for the good of the country as
a whole.19
This understanding of the purpose of property evolved into the
Jeffersonian conception of civic republicanism in the America of the
late eighteenth century. Although keen to distance itself from out-
moded feudal systems of tenure where land was concentrated in the
15. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 3; see C. Edwin Baker,
Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986).
16. Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 58.
17. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 1.
18. Id. at 1–2.
19. Id. at 1–2; see also Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 58–61.
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hands of an unchanging, undeserving aristocracy, civic republican-
ism retained the notion of property as essential to the social order.
Ownership of an appropriate amount of land allowed individuals to
be independent rather than relying on the favour of the aristocracy,
meaning they were free to participate in the creation and mainte-
nance of the public good, described by Thomas Jefferson as the pur-
suit of “republican virtue.”20 Responsibility towards the less fortunate
was viewed as an inherent aspect of this virtue.21 Although civic re-
publicans eschewed the European form of aristocracy, a hierarchy
was still evident within the social structures of the new republic—
only white men of certain social standing were empowered to own
land. In more recent times, theorists such as Charles Reich22 and Cass
Sunstein23 have sought to move away from the hierarchical aspects
of the civic republican conception of property whilst retaining the
aspects of social obligation inherent within them.24
Government takings of property make sense in this conception
since property rights are justified only to the extent necessary for
the good of society. If an owner of property is not fulfilling the obli-
gations which come alongside that ownership, the State is justified
in compelling that action for the benefit of the community.25 If a
person has more property than she needs to meet her social respon-
sibilities, there can be little justification for retaining the excess
where the community has need of it. Compensation may be appro-
priate, but it need not be “market value”—only sufficient to reflect
the needs of her social role. It is also legitimate to treat different
types of property differently in a takings regime where this concep-
tion holds sway, since some property is essential to the discharge of
the owner’s social responsibility, whereas the remainder is not.
Property as propriety can also be associated within a certain type
of liberty, in this case the freedom to achieve certain ends.26 Alexan-
der notes an important distinction between the two accounts of
property in that regard. Property as commodity is concerned with
20. Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 61–62.
21. Id.
22. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
23. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
24. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 63–64.
25. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 2.
26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the structure of society only in a purely instrumental sense. It de-
mands that individuals be free to operate securely within the market,
meaning that the society which results will be based on market
transactions; but what that society actually looks like is of no con-
cern in the commodity model. Property as propriety, by contrast,
uses property law as a tool with which to achieve a normative vision
of an appropriate form of society. It is concerned with substantive out-
comes. The nature of those outcomes will vary in different times,
places, and societal philosophies, but there will always be substan-
tive values at the centre of a proprietarian outlook, and the property
rules put in place under that view will be in service to those values.27
C. The Operation of Constitutional Property Protection
Constitutional protection of property will operate quite differently
in a context where the property-as-commodity narrative prevails
than in a context where the property-as-propriety narrative is domi-
nant. At one end of the spectrum, best symbolized by Robert Nozick’s
“night watchman state,” constitutional property rights should
operate to prevent virtually any state action impacting on individual
ownership.28 Property as commodity is embedded, if not articulated,
within the Nozickian view of rights. The alleged adoption of this
view of property by U.S. lawmakers is what underscores Jennifer
Nedelsky’s concerns over the constitutionalization of property,
which she fears will lead to entrenched economic inequality resulting
from powerful property rights becoming insulated in a regulation-
free private enclave.29
In the property-as-propriety narrative, however, the protection
offered by a constitutional clause is limited by the social obligations
inherent in property ownership. Explicit recognition of such obliga-
tions can in fact be found within the constitutional property clauses
of various countries, most notably in Article 14 of the Basic Law for
27. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 3.
28. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
29. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY ch. 6, at 203–76 (1990) (dis-
cussing the flawed vision underlying American constitutionalism and the role of its original
focus on property).
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the Federal Republic of Germany30 and in Section 25 of the South
African Bill of Rights.31 Alexander demonstrates that some form of
the obligation may also be detected in constitutional jurisprudence
even where it is not explicit within the text of a country’s constitu-
tion itself, using both Canadian and U.S. takings jurisprudence as
examples.32
The distinction is neatly summarised by Andre van der Walt, who
describes a contrast between a constitutional property clause used
as guarantee as opposed to one used as a limitation.33 Free market,
minimalist-state libertarianism and the barrier it erects between
public and private spheres argues for a property clause acting as a
guarantee that private property will be insulated from state regula-
tion in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.34 However, if
property is understood to come with responsibilities, a constitutional
property protection would operate to secure a minimum level of
rights for owners, sufficient to ensure human dignity, without re-
moving the discretion of the State to limit or redefine the non-essen-
tial aspects of property where necessary to achieve social goods.35
30. Grundesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 14, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet
.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0085 (Ger.). The text translates as follows:
(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and
limits shall be defined by the laws.
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.
(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be
ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of com-
pensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In case
of dispute respecting the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the
ordinary courts.
31. S. AFR. CONST., Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2017, http://www.justice.gov.za
/legislation/constitution (full text omitted for space).
32. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY,
chs. 1, 5 (2006) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, GLOBAL]; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Civic
Property, 6 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 217 (1997); Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental
Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2003); Gregory S. Alexander, The
Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
33. See Andre van der Walt, The Constitutional Property Clause: Striking a Balance
Between Guarantee and Limitation, in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 109, 109–46 (Janet
McLean ed., 1999).
34. Id. at 123–25.
35. Id. at 126–28.
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II. EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
ARTICLE 1 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL
A. The European Convention on Human Rights
In addition to property clauses included within the individual
constitutions of many European states, citizens of Europe also
benefit from the protection given to ownership as a human right
under Article 1 of the First Protocol (“A1P1”) to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.36 The Convention was drafted between
1949 and 1951 by the Council of Europe (“Council”), an intergovern-
mental grouping of European nations founded in the aftermath of
the Second World War with the aim of furthering European political
co-operation by protecting human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law.37 Originally formed by ten countries, membership of the Coun-
cil has expanded over the decades and now stands at forty-seven
countries, including several states which were formerly part of the
Communist bloc.38 Every State that is a member of the Council is
also a signatory to the Convention. The European Union39 has also
acceded to the Convention in its own right, meaning that actions
taken by the EU must be Convention compliant.40 Every signatory
36. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18,
1954).
37. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. I,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No.005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
38. A detailed treatment of the history of the Council of Europe can be found in DENIS
HUBER, A DECADE WHICH MADE HISTORY: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 1989–1999 (1999).
39. Although the terminology can be confusing, it is important to distinguish between the
Council of Europe, an international organisation whose forty-seven government members are
focused principally on the protection of human rights and the rule of law, and the European
Union, a group of twenty-eight member states joined in a political and economic union
requiring (subject to certain exceptions) use of a shared currency and free movement of goods,
services, and people within its area. The Council of Europe has no directly elected members
in its institutional bodies and no power to legislate: it operates in a manner somewhat similar
to the United Nations. The European Union, with its directly elected Parliament and legis-
lative, executive, and judicial branches, is more like a form of federal government for the
States who have been permitted to join it (unless and until such a State chooses to leave it,
of course). For more information, the standard textbook in this area is LORNA WOODS &
PHILIPPA WATSON, STEINER & WOOD’S EU LAW (12th ed. 2014).
40. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union art. 6(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326). For an examination
of how human rights protection operates in combination between the two European systems,
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State must implement the Convention into its domestic legislation,
with enforcement actions pursued first through the courts of the
member States before a final right of appeal to the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.41
The protection of property rights is set out in Article 1 of the First
Protocol to the Convention. The text of the Convention is authentic
in both English and French, with the English version of the relevant
Article providing that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of the State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest
or to secure payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.42
B. Applying Article 1 of the First Protocol
When hearing an application in respect of Article 1 of the First
Protocol, the European Court of Human Rights follows a three-step
see Bruno de Witte, The Interaction between the European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER
(Patricia Popelier, Catherine Van de Heyning & Piet Van Nuffel eds., 2011).
41. Again, it is important to distinguish between the Strasbourg court, which has juris-
diction in respect to Convention claims only, and the European Court of Justice in Brussels,
Belgium, which is effectively the judicial branch of the EU.
42. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18,
1954). Curiously, the terms used in the French text do not correspond directly with the use
of “property” and “possessions” in the English text (see George L. Gretton, The Protection of
Property Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN SCOTS LAW (Alan Boyle, Chris Himsworth, Andrea Loux
& Hector MacQueen eds., 2002)). The French text reads:
Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens. Nul ne peut
être privé de sa propriété que pour cause d’utilité publique et dans les conditions
prévues par la loi et les principes généraux du droit international.
Les dispositions précédentes ne portent pas atteinte au droit que possèdent les
États de mettre en vigueur les lois qu’ils jugent nécessaires pour réglementer
l’usage des biens conformément à l’intérêt général ou pour assurer le paiement des
impôts ou d’autres contributions ou des amendes.
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process to ascertain whether the state action in question has led to
a violation of the applicant’s rights.
1. Engaging the Right: Possessions
First, the court will ascertain whether the applicant holds a “pos-
session” in the meaning used by the Convention. The significant
body of case law on this question provides useful data as to whether
property is viewed as commodity or propriety by the court. I will
examine this jurisprudence in detail in Part III below.
2. The Nature of the Interference: The Three Rules
Second, the court will ask whether the state action complained of
by the applicant has resulted in an interference with the protection
offered by Article 1. The decision in Sporrong and Lönnroth v.
Sweden,43 arguably the most significant decision on Article 1 to date,
explains the court’s approach to this question. The case concerned
two buildings located in an area of central Stockholm which had
been marked out for redevelopment by the city authorities. The
buildings were subject to expropriation permits, which made clear
that they would be subject to the exercise of eminent domain powers
as part of the redevelopment programme. These permits did not
restrict or remove any rights held by the owners as a matter of law,
but had a significant impact on the marketability of the buildings
in practice. The properties were, in addition, subject to a prohibition
on construction work. As a result of delays and amendments to the
redevelopment programme, the permits were extended on multiple
occasions, with the eventual result that the first applicant’s prop-
erty had been subject to the permit for twenty-three years, and the
second, for eight years. Ultimately, the redevelopment programme,
insofar as it affected the applicants’ properties, was cancelled. No
eminent domain powers were ever exercised.
In determining whether the series of actions taken by the city au-
thorities had resulted in a violation of the applicants’ rights, the court
found the protection offered by A1P1 to be comprised of three rules.
43. Sporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982), 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35 (1983), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57580.
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The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the prin-
ciple of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first
sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers depriva-
tion of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it ap-
pears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third
rule recognises that States are entitled, amongst other things,
to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the
purpose; it is contained within the second paragraph.44
The court went on to examine the limits of the second rule, noting
that it covered both formal and de facto expropriation,45 and consid-
ered whether the extent of the state interference with the applicants’
rights, though clearly falling short of de jure loss of title, would
nevertheless amount to deprivation of possessions under the first
rule of A1P1. The applicants contended that the limitations on their
properties throughout the time period in question were so excessive
that their property rights had effectively been deprived of any sub-
stance. By a very slim margin,46 the court disagreed. The focus of
the judgement was on the powers that remained to the applicants
whilst the properties were subject to the permits. The applicants’
rights were certainly precarious whilst the threat of expropriation
loomed, and their ability to sell their properties on the open market
was therefore considerably reduced. In addition, their rights to develop
the properties were circumscribed in many respects.47 However, the
possibility of sale existed nevertheless: the Swedish government
provided evidence of properties subject to similar restrictions which
had, as matter of fact, been sold during the relevant time period.48
The court concluded: “Although the right in question lost some of its
substance, it did not disappear. The effects of the measures involved
are not such that they can be assimilated to a deprivation of posses-
sions.”49 The application was instead dealt with as an interference
44. Id. ¶ 61, at 17, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35 (1983) ¶ 61, at 50.
45. Bramelid v. Sweden, App. No. 8588/79, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 64, 81
(1982), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74253.
46. The count was ten votes to nine. See Sporrong, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 89, at 25,
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 89, at 59.
47. Id. ¶ 62, 63, at 18, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 62, 63, at 51; accord, id. ¶ 58, at 16, 2 Eur. H.R.
Rep. ¶ 58, at 49.
48. Id. ¶ 30, at 7, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 30, at 40.
49. Id. ¶ 63, at 18, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 63, at 51.
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with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (rule one) in relation to
the expropriation permits, and a control of use (rule three) in rela-
tion to the prohibition of construction. A violation of the rights of
both applicants was ultimately found by ten votes to nine, and the
question of an appropriate remedy was reserved to allow the parties
time to seek a settlement.50
In addition to setting out the three rules contained within Article 1,
Sporrong is instructive as to the criteria by which the court will
determine whether an applicant has been deprived of her posses-
sions, or subjected to some lesser interference. In particular, the
case demonstrates that the right to dispose of the property is central
to the question of deprivation, but not determinative. In fact, very
few de facto deprivations have been recognised by the court in the
years subsequent to the Sporrong decision,51 even when the owner
is subject to severe restrictions on his use of the property with the
result that his ability to dispose of the property is rendered useless
in fact, if not in law.52 The majority of rule two cases result from de
jure losses of title.
The court has not scrutinised the meaning of “control of use” in
the same level of detail. Effectively, a state action will amount to
control of use when it falls short of the standard required for de
facto deprivation or in circumstances where common sense indicates
that the use of the property in question is being regulated. Common
examples of a state action which may be categorised as such control
include the imposition of rules of taxation53 or planning legislation,54
50. See Sporrong v. Sweden, 85 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984), 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD256
(1985). The first applicant was ultimately awarded eight hundred thousand Swedish Krona
(“SEK”) (approximately ninety-six thousand U.S. dollars), and the second application was
awarded two hundred thousand SEK (approximately twenty-four thousand U.S. dollars).
51. A rare example can be found in Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, 260-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1993), 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 440 (1993), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57836. See also
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 69 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 261,
266–69 (1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84089 (providing additional background
information).
52. For an example, see generally Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)
12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616.
53. See generally Spacek v. Czech Republic 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep.
1010 (2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58358 (imposition of additional income tax
liability, a control of use); Nat’l and Provincial Bldg. Soc’y v. United Kingdom 1997-VII Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2325, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58109 (removal of right to reclaim overpaid
tax, a control of use).
54. See generally Agrotexim v. Greece, 330-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 21 Eur. H.R.
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restrictions on rent,55 licensing laws,56 and the operation of rules of
succession.57
The relationship between the three rules is open to debate. In a
much cited dictum from James v. United Kingdom,58 the court indi-
cated that deprivation and control are particular instances of the
broader category of interference with peaceful enjoyment of pos-
sessions, and it seems clear that the court is bound to reject both the
second and third rules before it can find the first rule applicable.59
The court has also suggested that the categories operate as a set of
concentric circles, with deprivation as a subset of control, which is
in turn a subset of general interference with possessions.60
3. Justifying the Interference: Lawfulness, Legitimate Aim, and
Proportionality
The final step in the court’s adjudication process is to determine
whether the interference with the applicant’s property rights can be
justified. If so, the state action will not amount to a violation of
those rights.
For a justification to be established, the state action must pass
three tests. First, the court must be satisfied that the interference
was lawful, meaning that it had a clear basis in domestic law and
that the legal basis in question adhered to the basic rule-of-law
principles of clarity, accessibility, and nonretrospectivity.61 It is un-
usual for state action to fail this test, although not unheard of—with
Rep. 250 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57951 (planning restrictions preventing
development of land, a control of use).
55. See generally Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 12 Eur. H.R. Rep.
391 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616 (cap on rent levels, a control of use).
56. See generally Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989),
13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 309 (1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57586 (licensing regime for
sale of alcohol, a control of use).
57. See generally Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987), 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 394
(1987), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57505 (legal regulation of inheritance, a control
of use).
58. See James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123
(1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57507.
59. Id. ¶ 37, at 17, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 37, at 139–40.
60. See generally AGOSI v. United Kingdom, 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 9 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 1 (1987), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57418.
61. See James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 37, at 17, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 37, at 139–40.
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problems most likely to arise when discretion afforded to the State
to take certain steps is not sufficiently bounded.62
Secondly, the state action must pursue a legitimate aim in the
public or general interest.63 Given the complexity of the policy areas
in which state action is likely to affect property rights—the econ-
omy, housing, the environment—the court has been clear that States
have a wide margin of appreciation in determining what falls within
the public interest.64 As an unelected judiciary within a centralised
system, the court will not substitute its judgement on this question
for that of a democratically elected legislature within the jurisdic-
tion in question. Short of a situation in which a State fails to offer
any public interest argument for their action at all,65 state interfer-
ence will almost invariably pass this test.
Finally, the court must determine whether the interference was
proportionate, meaning that it struck a fair balance between the
public interest and the human rights of the applicant.66 It is hard to
discern any systematic approach to the court’s assessments of pro-
portionality in property cases. One can point to various factors that
may be taken into account—the strength of the public interest
served by the State67 or the extent of the applicant’s opportunity to
62. See, e.g., Vasilescu v. Romania, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1064, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 241
(1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58169 (confiscation of gold coins had no basis in
domestic law); Iatridis v. Greece (Art. 41), 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97
(2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59087 (the eviction order on which the State had
based their eviction of the applicant from the land had been quashed, so the State had no
lawful basis to prevent the applicant returning); Hentrich v. France, 296-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1994), 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 440 (1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57903 (provision
in the tax code allowing the State to pre-empt sale of land where the price was “too low” was
insufficiently precise to meet the test of foreseeability); Smirnov v. Russia, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 19
(2010), 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 19 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96399 (regulations which
allowed the State to retain property for an unlimited time where the property was “instru-
mental” to a criminal investigation were insufficiently precise to meet test of foreseeability).
63. These terms are used interchangeably in the jurisprudence.
64. James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 46, at 19 (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
¶ 46, at 142 (1986) (because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, elected
national authorities are better placed than an unelected international judge to determine
what is in the interest of their public, and must be afforded some discretion by the court).
65. See generally Zwierzyński v. Poland, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6
(2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59522 (the unsuccessful state defence to a claim
of expropriation was that no expropriation had taken place, with no argument made in
justification of its actions).
66. Sporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 69, at 19 (1982), 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 350
¶ 69, at 19 (1979).
67. See generally Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 12 Eur. H.R. Rep.
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be represented in the decision-making process68—but the only rule
that can be stated with any certainty is that a rule-two interference
(a deprivation of possessions) will not be proportionate unless the
applicant has received valuable compensation for his loss.69 My dis-
cussion of the development of this rule, and what it can tell us about
the court’s view of property as commodity or propriety, follows in
Part III.
III. EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
COMMODITY OR PROPRIETY?
In the first two parts of this paper, I have outlined the competing
accounts of property as commodity and property as propriety devel-
oped in U.S. constitutional property scholarship and explained the
nature of the property rights protection offered by Article 1 of the
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. Next,
I address the central research question I posed in the introduction.
In this third part of the paper, I argue that the clash of normative
values articulated through the commodity/propriety analysis of the
U.S. takings jurisprudence can also be identified in relation to
Article 1 of the First Protocol. In demonstrating this hypothesis, I
examine the text of Article 1, the approach of the European Court
of Human Rights to defining which “possessions” are protected by
the Article, and the requirement developed by the court that com-
pensation must be paid for every deprivation of possessions before
it can meet the test of proportionality.
A. The Wording of the Protection
Alexander’s comparative work reveals that robust constitutional
protection of property can exist without any written document or bill
391 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616 (rent controls aimed to prevent housing
crisis); Spadea v. Italy, 315-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57937 (regulation of rental property during accommo-
dation shortage).
68. See generally AGOSI v. United Kingdom, 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 9 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 1 (1987), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57418 (discussing extensive domestic appeal
process available for confiscation of allegedly smuggled goods).
69. See generally James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 123 (1986).
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of rights.70 Where express clauses do exist, however, dramatic dif-
ferences in wording are found from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
U.S. Takings Clause is notoriously brief, providing simply: “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.”71 Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution of Australia makes a
similarly succinct provision for “the acquisition of property on just
terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which
the Parliament has the power to make laws.”72
Within Europe, constitutional property clauses tend to be more de-
tailed, particularly as regards justification for state intervention with
property rights. Article 14 of the German Basic Law has been given
as an example above.73 The Italian Constitution of 1948 also makes
explicit reference to the social function of property, recognising the
possibility of expropriation with compensation in the public interest in
addition to other regulatory restraints on ownership and property.74
In drafting terms, A1P1 occupies a position somewhere in the
middle of these two approaches. Its first sentence contains a positive
statement of the right to property, which might be assumed to pro-
vide a more robust protection than in jurisdictions like the United
States where such a right is merely implied.75 The second and third
sentences appear, on their face, to contain what law and economics
scholars would categorise as liability rules76: that no one shall be
deprived of possessions except in the public interest and subject to
relevant legal conditions; and that the State may control the use of
property in the general interest, or to secure payment of taxes, other
contributions, or penalties.77
Reading the text offers little guidance, however, as to which con-
ception of property underpins the protection envisaged by the clause.
In fact, the wording can lend itself to potential constructions in
70. ALEXANDER, GLOBAL, supra note 32, ch. 1.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
72. Australian Constitution s 51.
73. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
74. Art. 42 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.).
75. Alexander challenges the assumption that property rights are most strongly protected
where a positive statement of this kind appears in a constitutional document. See ALEXANDER,
GLOBAL, supra note 32, ch. 1.
76. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
77. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18, 1954).
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support of both the commodity and propriety approaches. The posi-
tive statement of a right to property, in combination with the some-
what vaguely expressed liability rules, could support a commodity
account. This interpretation would require the case law to employ
a restrictive definition of “public interest” and “general interest,”
limited to the types of situation where state intervention would result
in greater collective wealth maximisation, and to offer no real scope
for public interest to encapsulate redistributive objectives. A com-
modity argument constructed purely from the text would be weak-
ened, however, by the absence of an express right to compensation
for deprivation. The lack of any written compensation requirement
forms the foundation of a proprietarian understanding of Article 1.
This understanding would be bolstered by case law employing a wide
interpretation of the public-interest/general-interest requirements.
The travaux préparatoires make clear that the ambiguous wording
of Article 1 results not from a failure to capture the normative under-
standing of property intended by the drafters but rather from the
political divisions and ideological uncertainty on that point which
affected the drafting process. Although some rumination on the core
purposes of property law as an institution can be detected within
the drafting debates,78 no attempt was made to define any version
of those purposes. The lack of agreement amongst European nations
as to the role of property as an institution was acknowledged,79 but
not considered fatal to the inclusion of the protection within the
Convention. Some delegates suggested clarity in the meaning of the
Article would best be achieved not through debate at the drafting
stage but through the development of the jurisprudence of the court.80
78. See, e.g., Statement of De Valera, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉ-
PARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 62, 104 (Martinus Nijhoff
1975); Statement of Nally, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 80.
79. See Statement of Edberg, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”
ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 86; Statement of Teitgen,
in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 126.
80. See Statement of Mitchison, in 6 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARA-
TOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 97–98; Statement
of Pernot, in 6 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 106; Report by Committee of Experts, in
4 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 18–21.
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To be clear, a reader will not find within the travaux prépara-
toires any reference to commodity or propriety, or any real norma-
tive discussion at all. What can be seen is clear agreement that
some level of protection of property against the State is a civil and
political necessity in a world where totalitarian regimes would use
arbitrary dispossession as a mechanism for silencing dissent.81
However, this is qualified by a lack of agreement about where that
level should be set. In other words, the clash between the competing
normative perspectives identified by Rose and Alexander seems to
have been built into Article 1 from the beginning. The text was
designed to allow for either interpretation to be possible.
B. The Meaning of “Possessions”
The term “possessions” has an autonomous meaning for the
purposes of the Convention.82 This allows the court to interpret the
term in a manner consistent with the delivery of the real and effec-
tive protection of rights that the Convention is intended to provide.83
Without an autonomous definition, a State could simply deny that
a property rights violation had occurred by using a domestic law defi-
nition to argue that no “possessions” were affected. For the purposes
of my argument, the interest lies in how this autonomous definition
has been developed by the court over time. As has been made clear
in the first part of this paper, a definition animated by a commodity
view of property is likely to look somewhat different to one animated
by a proprietarian approach. What can the definition the court has
developed in its jurisprudence reveal about the underlying norma-
tive values it ascribes to property protection in Article 1?
In a commodity account, possessions would be broadly construed
to equate with wealth. Anything with a financial value should fall
81. See Statement of Sundt, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”
ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 10; Statement of de la
Vallée-Poussin, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 62; Statement of de la Vallée-Poussin, in
2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 62.
82. See generally Beyeler v. Italy, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 57, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (2001),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58832.
83. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) ¶ 24, at 9, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 205 (1979)
¶ 24, at 9, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57420 (“The Convention is intended to guaran-
tee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.”).
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within the definition, regardless of its intrinsic nature—whether tan-
gible or intangible, in rem or in personam—since autonomy through
individual and societal wealth maximisation is the ultimate goal of
property-law rules. Where a person has a legitimate expectation of
acquiring something with a financial value, the expectation of that
interest should also be protected, since security of property rights is
considered a key element of a successful system.
To date, the Strasbourg jurisprudence has been broadly consis-
tent with this approach. Economic value is at the core of determin-
ing what a possession is,84 whether with respect to tangible85 or
intangible86 assets. The value must be capable of transfer or some
other form of realization.87 Where an applicant had a legitimately
held expectation of acquiring such an interest, that will be sufficient
in itself to attract the protection of Article 1.88 An interest with no
economic value, such as the right to pursue a hobby89 or the right to
84. In the admissibility decision in Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, the European
Commission of Human Rights noted that the company shares concerned in the dispute
certainly had an economic value and must therefore be possessions. See Bramelid v. Sweden,
App. No. 8588/79, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 76, 81 (1982), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-74445.
85. See, e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58062 (ownership of land); Wittek v. Germany, 2002-X
Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60815
(usufruct over land).
86. See, e.g., Intersplav v. Ukraine, App. No. 803/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 2007), 50 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 4 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-78872 (right to a tax refund); Paeffgen
GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 18, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-82671 (registration of domain names); Kline v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 4, 1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-738 (patent); Melnychuk v.
Ukraine, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70089 (copyright).
87. See Durini v. Italy, App. No. 19217/91, 76-B Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 76 (1994),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-82831 (nonalienable usufruct held by the firstborn son in
respect to the ancestral home was held not to be a possession, in contrast to the transferable
usufruct found to be a possession in Wittek, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46).
88. The rules here are usefully elaborated in a series of cases concerning licences, with
the broad principle that where a licence has been granted on certain conditions and where the
licence-holder has dutifully fulfilled those conditions, they have a legitimate expectation that
the licence will be retained. See, e.g., Batelaan v. Netherlands, App. No. 10438/83, 41 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 170 (1984), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74878; van Marle
v. Netherlands, 101 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep 483 (1986), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57590; Pudas v. Sweden 125-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987), 10 Eur.
H.R. Rep 380 (1988), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57562; Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v.
Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 309 (1991). The possession in
question here has been identified as the income and goodwill generated by holding the licence.
89. See generally R.C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37664/97, 94-B Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 119 (1998), 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 10 (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88213.
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hold a driving licence (when not being used for employment-related
purposes),90 will not constitute a possession. In brief, the focus is on
property as wealth.
The proprietarian account would argue for a different under-
standing of possessions in two key respects. In the first place, for a
proprietarian, ownership of a certain amount of property is an es-
sential requirement of participation in a democratic society. The
“real and effective protection” the property right seeks to provide
could not, therefore, be entirely decoupled from substantive redis-
tributive outcomes: constitutional property protection must guaran-
tee each citizen the freedom to pursue social goods, not simply limit
(or provide freedom from) state interference with the property that
person happens to own.91 What property would fall within this
proprietarian minimum? At one time, the answer might have been
something like the U.S. homestead—a building in which to live along
with sufficient space to produce food to support a family. This con-
cept was updated for more modern times by Charles Reich,92 who
argued that in a world dominated by large corporations and the
large State, it was no longer possible for an individual to secure his
independence through private ownership of productive assets. To
achieve the same independence in the modern world, private prop-
erty must be reconceptualised to include state “largess”93—benefits,
services, licences—as being held in the hands of individuals.94 This
“new property” covers the basic requirements for subsistence. Con-
nections can be drawn between this and subsequent works arguing
that a meaningful property protection would encapsulate additional
aspects essential to human flourishing, such the right to a clean
environment95 and the right to public ownership of public property.96
The new property concept is not entirely unsupported in Strasbourg
case law. The most obvious example of consonance with the concept
90. See generally X. v. Germany, App. No. 9177/80, 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 255
(1981), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74038.
91. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
92. See Reich, supra note 22.
93. Id. at 734–37.
94. Id. at 785–86.
95. See generally Gudmundur Alfredsson & Alexander Ovsiouk, Human Rights and the
Environment, 60 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 19 (1991).
96. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and In-
herently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); John Page, Towards an Understanding
of Public Property, in 7 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 195 (Nicholas Hopkins ed., 2013).
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is the court’s approach to welfare benefits. In this respect, the court’s
position shifted gradually from an initial view that a state benefit
could not constitute a possession97 to a recognition that where contri-
butions had been made—for example, into a social security scheme—a
possession in the form of a pecuniary right to claim from that fund
might emerge,98 including situations where the contributions were
made by way of general taxation.99 This view soon expanded to in-
corporate both contributory and non-contributory benefit schemes,100
until finally the court stated that where
a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the
payment as of right of a welfare benefit—whether conditional or
not on the prior payment of contributions—that legislation must
be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within
the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its
requirements.101
In other words, it now seems settled that where legislation provides
for a public law benefit, a private property right may emerge, much
in line with Reich’s thinking. A possession of that kind may still be
removed by the State, but as with any other private property right,
such action would have to be lawful, in the public interest, and
proportionate.
A different instance of the court arguably recognising a form of
substantive entitlement within Article 1 of the First Protocol is
Öneryildiz v. Turkey.102 In that case the applicant successfully argued
97. See generally X. v. Germany, App. No. 2116/64 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 17, 1966),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2975.
98. See generally X. v. Netherlands, App. No. 4130/69, 38 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
9 (1971), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-3101; G v. Austria, App. No. 10094/82, 38 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 84 (1984), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73786; Müller v.
Austria, App. No. 5849/72, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 50 (1974), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-75078; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1141, http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-58060.
99. See generally Stec v. United Kingdom, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep.
47 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73198.
100. See generally Andrejeva v. Latvia, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-91388.
101. Moskal v. Poland, App. No. 10373/05, ¶ 38, at 9 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 15, 2009), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-94009 (citation omitted).
102. See Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67614.
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that a makeshift dwelling constructed in contravention of domestic
planning rules, on a refuse tip which he did not own, was a posses-
sion. The court relied on ambiguous state policy surrounding slum
settlements in general, together with state inaction with respect to
this particular dwelling over a period of five years, to find that the
applicant did have a proprietary interest in the dwelling which the
State had de facto acknowledged. This reliance on the state’s (in)action
means that the case cannot be read as accepting the proprietarian
view that all persons require a stake in property to participate in
society—it does not create a right to a dwelling. However, the court’s
focus on the idea that the State should have recognised the appli-
cant’s right as proprietary within domestic law, together with fur-
ther comment on the positive duties incumbent on States under
A1P1, goes beyond a reductive “night watchman state” view of prop-
erty rights.103
Öneryildiz also provides interesting insight into the second way
that the proprietarian account argues for an understanding of pos-
sessions different than the one supported by the commodity account.
This argument builds on the work of Morris Cohen, who considered
property as providing not only dominium (power over things) but
also imperium (power over people).104 All private property connotes
imperium of some sort, in the sense that the owner can exclude
another person from using the thing in question. However, in some
situations—for example, in relation to ownership of large-scale as-
sets such as companies—the extent of that power over the lives of
others can be profound. Modern proprietarian understandings seek
to develop property-law rules that prevent the establishment of this
type of entrenched economic and social hierarchy. Michael Robert-
son argues that it is necessary to separate out private property that
gives power over others from private property that does not, in order
to protect individuals who are subject to this exercise of power, and
also to prevent those exercising the power from sheltering behind
103. The State’s positive obligation to protect dwellings even where the exact nature of the
dweller’s property rights was contested is also discussed in Kolyadenko v. Russia, App. No.
17423/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2012), 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-109283, in which the homes of several families were washed away when the local
reservoir burst its banks, and the loss was attributed to the failure of the State to take
appropriate steps to mitigate the known flooding risk.
104. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927).
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the justifications given for nonpowerful property.105 Nonpowerful
property could be said to cover only what is “appropriate” in the
proprietarian sense. Powerful property is the excess, and therefore
subject to a greater social obligation.
The decision in Öneryildiz arguably contains a grain of this
approach to categorization of property, in the sense that the court’s
willingness to deem the existence of a possession in the case was
influenced by the fundamental nature of the asset in question. The
applicant was looking for recognition of a very basic shelter. Had he
been seeking recognition of something less vital to his day-to-day
survival—an asset critical to his financial rather than his physical
safety—it is questionable whether the court would have taken the
same approach. In a pure commodity approach to possessions, on
the contrary, no right would have been recognised at all.
C. The Requirement of Compensation
The development of the definition of possessions shows the court
largely making use of a commodity-type approach to property, with
occasional diversions into propriety territory. The evolution of the
rules on compensation for deprivation of possessions, however, shows
a clear example of the commodity view being adopted wholesale.
Although the text of Article 1 includes no express right to compensa-
tion, and the drafters of the Convention were unable to reach agree-
ment on whether such a provision should be made, over time the
jurisprudence has established a requirement that “valuable” (usu-
ally meaning market value) compensation be paid for almost any
deprivation of possessions. Where this level of compensation is not
made available, the state action will almost invariably be found to
be disproportionate.
The roots of the court’s approach to compensation are found in
Lithgow v. United Kingdom,106 an application arising from the na-
tionalisation of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries in the
United Kingdom in the 1970s. The court recognised that the refer-
ence to the “general principles of international law” in the text of
105. See Michael Robertson, Property and Ideology, 8 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 275, 280-
281 (1995).
106. See Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
329 (1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57526.
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Article 1107 did not have the effect of requiring that compensation be
paid for every interference with the right. However:
The Court observes that under the legal systems of the Contract-
ing States, the taking of property in the public interest without
payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in excep-
tional circumstances not relevant for present purposes. As far as
Article 1 . . . is concerned, the protection of the right of property
it affords would be largely illusory and ineffective in the absence
of any equivalent principle.108
As Tom Allen notes, whether protection would be illusory or ineffec-
tive depends on the purpose of the property right in the first place.109
In terms of the value of compensation to be awarded, the court went
on to note:
The taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably
related to its value would normally constitute a disproportionate
interference which could not be considered justifiable under
Article 1 . . . . Article 1 . . . does not, however, guarantee a right to
full compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives
of “public interest,” such as pursued in measures of economic
reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice,
may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.110
In itself, Lithgow does not exclude the possibility of a proprietarian
approach: in fact, the court’s express recognition that public-interest
demands, including social-justice measures, might justify something
less than market-value compensation would seem to leave space for
a proprietarian jurisprudence to develop. In subsequent case law,
however, arguments of this kind have not proved successful.
A stark example is Holy Monasteries v. Greece,111 in which eight mo-
nastic estates acquired by the applicants some decades previously
107. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18, 1954).
108. Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 120, at 43, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 ¶ 121, at 372.
109. Tom Allen, Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1055, 1067 (2010).
110. Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 121, at 44, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 ¶ 121, at 372
(citation omitted).
111. See Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), 20 Eur. H.R. Rep.
1 (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57906.
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had been restored to the State without payment of compensation. At
the level of the European Commission of Human Rights, it had been
accepted that the circumstances justified the absence of compensa-
tion: the estates had initially been given to the applicants to facili-
tate the administration of tasks such as social care and education,
which had subsequently been taken over by the State. Even when
the applicants had been providing the social services in question,
they had been financially reliant on the Greek Orthodox Church, in
itself funded by the State. From a proprietarian perspective, the
applicants had been given the property to perform a social function
which they were no longer required to perform, making it only
appropriate for the property to be transferred to the entity now per-
forming that function. The commission appeared to agree with this
approach. The court, however, disregarded these arguments in
reviewing the case as a more straightforward deprivation of private
ownership. It considered the burden borne by the applicants in the
case to be disproportionate in the absence of compensation, and so
it found a violation of Article 1.
The jurisprudence surrounding legislation on security of tenancy
also seems to indicate a gradual shift towards a commodity approach
to compensation regardless of the dicta in Lithgow. On several oc-
casions, the court has been asked to review legislation designed to
enhance security of tenure for residential tenants in circumstances
where housing is in crisis and homelessness is a real risk. Although
the details of the regimes vary, in general they entail controlled-rent
levels and/or restrictions on the landlord’s right to evict the tenant.
A proprietarian might argue that, provided the landlord had suffi-
cient alternative property to enable her to fulfil her social role,112 a
profitable investment property is not deserving of constitutional
rights protection. Sublimating the landlord’s rights in the property
to those of the tenant—who does, after all, need a place to live—
should not therefore require compensation. The court’s initial view
of such legislation seemed broadly in accordance with this proposi-
tion. In Mellacher v. Austria,113 for example, the court was content
to find that matters fell within the State’s margin of appreciation,
despite legislative controls reducing rental income by more than
112. See supra Part I.B.
113. See Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391
(1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616.
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eighty percent, in some cases, without allowing landlords the right
to compensation.114 More recently, however, the court’s position has
shifted.115 For example, in Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, a violation was
found on the basis that the landlord’s “entitlement to derive profit
from their property” had been disproportionately impacted by the
regime in question,116 a decision significantly more in keeping with
a commodity account of property rules.
In the search for counterexamples, it is possible to point to a line
of cases in which less than market-value compensation has been
justified, namely in those cases related to the reallocation of prop-
erty in former Communist countries.117 Here, the court seems willing
to accept that owners who acquired property during a Communist
regime, and are expropriated of that property post-communism, may
not be entitled to receive (full) compensation when the original
acquisition is considered illegitimate.118 The owner could or should
have had no expectation that her ownership would continue, and so
no compensation is merited. An argument can be made that these
cases indicate some acceptance of a social obligation attaching to
property ownership in the eyes of the court, but that argument has
a flaw. As Allen points out, these cases are really about transitional
rather than social justice119: the underlying inference in the court’s
language is that once the transition period ends—with the estab-
lishment of a liberal market economy—the “normal” rules will once
again apply and market-value compensation will be required.
114. See generally Spadea v. Italy, 315-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 21 Eur. H.R. Rep.
482 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57937; Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, 1999-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. 73, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756 (2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58292; Scollo
v. Italy, 315-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 514 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-57936.
115. See generally Schirmer v. Poland, App. No. 68880/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 21, 2004), 40
Eur. H.R. Rep. 47 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-66642; Radovici v. Romania, 2006-
XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77789.
116. See Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, 2006-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 ¶ 239, at 83, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 4 ¶ 239, at 134 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-75882.
117. See generally Jahn v. Germany, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 55, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49 (2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-69560; Zvolský v. Czech Republic, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.
163, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60749; Pincová v. Czech Republic, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 311, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60726.
118. The court would generally take this view when the applicant had acquired the prop-
erty during the Communist era as a result of its expropriation without compensation from the
prior owner.
119. Allen, supra note 109, at 1073.
2017] PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND THE ECHR 29
CONCLUSION
In the introduction, I asked whether a tension between the com-
modity and propriety accounts of property could be identified in
relation to the protection offered by Article 1 of the First Protocol to
the ECHR. My exploration of the jurisprudence in Part III suggests
that this tension does exist. As in U.S. takings jurisprudence, the
commodity account is dominant within European case law, but ex-
cursions into the proprietarian narrative can also be identified.
The follow-on question that inevitably suggests itself is: why
should we care? In short, my argument is that law benefits from
clarity. When a person seeks to rely on the rights offered under
Article 1, it should be possible to ascertain exactly what those rights
are and to predict with some certainty whether the court would find
an action taken by the State in violation of those rights. This basic
tenet of the rule of law is of particular significance in the context of
the fundamental rights under discussion here. A statement of rights
does not exist purely to provide a remedy in instances when a State
oversteps its bounds. It should also perform a normative function in
directing States towards appropriate behaviour. If the right in
question is poorly understood, its ability to perform this function is
reduced. Even a scrupulous State may fail to respect the property
rights of its citizens if the extent of those rights is confused. The
lack of normative coherence in relation to Article 1 reduces its
clarity and undermines the protection it should provide. In addition,
it prevents meaningful analysis of whether the protection provided
by the right is set at the correct level.
Furthermore, as with U.S. case law, identifying the normative
values at play in the jurisprudence can help to explain areas where
those decisions do not seem to make sense. One striking example of
this in European jurisprudence concerns cases in which state action
has resulted in the de jure loss of an applicant’s title, but the court
has determined the loss to be a rule three control of use rather than
a rule two deprivation of possessions.120 This occurs, it seems, in
120. See generally Gasus Dosier v. Netherlands, 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 20 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 403 (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57918 (applicant’s property being
held by a third party was seized as partial repayment of that party’s debt to the state); Butler
v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 349, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-22577 (two
hundred forty thousand pounds in cash seized on the suspicion of use in criminal activity was
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cases where the court does not consider the losses in question to
merit payments of compensation.121 Since the court has developed
a rule that compensation must be paid for a deprivation, in such
circumstances it is left with no other option than to say a loss of title
is merely a control of use.
This absurd result comes about precisely because the normative
basis for the compensation requirement has never been acknowl-
edged. If I have correctly argued that the compensation requirement
has developed through the court’s adoption of a commodity account
of property, it follows that the compensation requirement has limits.
Had the court acknowledged this normative underpinning to its case
law, it could have gone on to develop a line of normatively justified
exceptions to the compensation rule. Without that acknowledgment,
the case law has become, to use a familiar term, a “muddle.”
There is no doubt that European scholars have some distance yet
to travel to match the breadth and depth of constitutional property
analysis developed by our U.S. counterparts to date. The ambition
of this article is to begin bridging that gap, informed by the valuable
dialogue between participants from both sides of the Atlantic during
the conference in The Hague last year. I look forward to continuing
these discussions as the European scholarship develops.
forfeited despite no criminal conviction of applicant); J. A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd. V. United
Kingdom, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-82172 (applicant’s title was lost through the operation of domestic doctrine of
adverse possession); Booker Aquaculture v. Sec’y of State [2003] 3 CMLR 6 (Scot.) (state-
ordered slaughter of fish stock to lower the risk of the spread of piscine disease).
121. See David Anderson, Compensation for Interference with Property, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 543, 553 (1999); George. L. Gretton, The Protection of Property Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND SCOTS LAW 279 (Alan Boyle, Chris Himsworth, Andrea Loux & Hector MacQueen
eds., 2002).
